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ACCELERATED EDUCATION AS A REMEDY 
FOR ffiGH-POVERTY SCHOOLS 
William H. Clune• 
High-poverty schools, and the students who attend them, have historically 
faced substantial challenges in providing, and receiving, adequate 
education. Despite some relief from the courts, school finance remedies 
that require the redistribution of monetary aid to low-wealth districts 
have encountered strong political opposition. In this Article, Professor 
Clune makes a renewed claim for accelerated education as the primary 
focus of adequacy litigation in school reform cases. He describes the 
nation's educational condition, in which there exists a disturbing correla-
tion between poverty and low educational outcomes. He then drafts a 
vision of a comprehensive, school reform remedy, one that emphasizes 
institutional success over accountability, and discusses how this remedy 
compensates for the inadequacies of reforms suggested by other commenta-
tors. Finally, Professor Clune concludes that adequacy theory uniquely 
responds to the needs of high-poverty schools and provides the guidance 
necessary to achieving better education. 
INTRODUCTION: THE PRIORITY OF POOR 
CHILDREN IN ADEQUACY LITIGATION 
Logically, the poor should be a principal beneficiary of ade-
quacy litigation. Adequacy refers to resources which are suffi-
cient (or adequate) to achieve minimum outcomes and should 
be distinguished from equity, which requires equal resources 
regardless ofresults. Any theory focused on minimum outcomes 
could hardly overlook the strong correlation between poverty 
and substandard educational outcomes.1 As pointed out by Dean 
Underwood, a sense of vertical equity-the special needs of 
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1. Robert Berne, Educational Input and Outcome Inequities in New York State, in 
OUTCOME EQUITY IN EDUCATION 1, 20-21 (Robert Berne & Lawrence 0. Picus eds., 
1994); Gary Natriello, Four Perspectives on the Disparities Between the Educational 
Resources Available to Students'in the Hartford Public Schools and Other Connecticut 
Communities 5-7, figs. 1-7 (Apr. 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
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various students in meeting minimum standards-pervades 
adequacy cases.2 Courts have spoken eloquently about the dire 
consequences of allowing a large segment of American society 
to slip into permanent educational decline.3 Extra resources 
certainly seem relevant. Books have been written about the 
abysmal condition of many schools in low income areas.4 Any 
teacher could likely speak to the unavailability of the additional 
time required to meet the unique educational needs of economi-
cally poor children and their families. Indeed, courts have 
begun to fashion compensatory remedies. For example, the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey has ordered extra funding,5 the 
Alabama judiciary has included social services,6 and the State 
of Kentucky has begun searching for programs that effectively 
provide accelerated education.7 
Even with such new remedies, these are perilous times for 
poor children. School finance remedies which redistribute aid to 
high-poverty districts typically encounter fierce political resis-
tance and controversy.8 Contemporary conservative political 
thought makes two powerful, though logically redundant, crit-
icisms of compensatory aid-that poor minority children cannot 
reach minimum standards9 and that public schools do not 
2. Julie K Underwood, School Finance Adequacy as Vertical Equity, 28 U. MICH. 
J.L. REF. 493, 495-96, 516-17 (1995). 
3. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 209-13 (Ky. 
1989) (declaring that "every child" in Kentucky, whether rich or poor, must be provided 
with a constitutionally adequate educational opportunity); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 
359, 397-99, 411-12 (N.J. 1990) (describing the inadequate facilities and low achieve-
ment statistics of certain poor, urban school districts in New Jersey, in sharp contrast 
to the resources and educational results of that state's richer, suburban districts). 
4. See, e.g., JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S 
SCHOOLS (1991) (discussing conditions ~hat make academic achievement difficult or 
impossible in America's poor and segregated schools). 
5. Abbott, 575 A.2d at 408-10. 
6. Martha I. Morgan et al., Establishing Education Program Inadequacy: The 
Alabama Example, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 559, 598 (1995). For a brief introduction to 
and discussion of accelerated education, see generally HENRY M. LEVIN, CENTER FOR 
POL 'y RESEARCH IN EDUC., ACCELERATED SCHOOLS FOR AT-RlsK STUDENTS (1988), which 
discusses accelerated education as a means of raising the academic performance of 
"educationally disadvantaged or at-risk students." 
7. C. Scott Trimble & Andrew C. Forsaith, Achieving Equity and Excellence in 
Kentucky Education, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 599, 646-48 (1995). 
8. Margaret E. Goertz, School Finance Reform in New Jersey: The Saga Contin· 
ues, 18 J. EDUC. FIN. 346, 349-50, 363 (1993). 
9. For a discussion of such politically conservative criticisms, see RICHARD J. 
HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS 
STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994). The Bell Curve is not clear on how much poor 
children can learn. Chapter 17 cites some examples of successful remedial education but 
claims that further research is needed and that implementation on a wide scale would 
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always use extra resources in an efficient manner.10 School 
choice is much touted as a remedy for poor families, 11 but 
decentralization has a "dark side" as it easily could be used in 
the service of anti-tax forces to slash educational spending for 
the poor without improving schools or raising achievement.12 
Meanwhile, partly to secure political consensus, adequacy cases 
themselves may focus on equal funding and statewide reform as 
remedies, thereby overlooking the more intense and politically 
awkward claims of society's most disadvantaged. 
This Article is intended to remind us of the case for including 
accelerated education13 as the primary focus of adequacy litiga-
be too expensive. See id. at 415. Chapter 18 notes improved achievement throughout 
the 20th century but also includes this enigmatic call for "realism": 
[c)ritics of American education must come to terms with the reality that in a uni-
versal education system, many students will not reach the level of education that 
most people view as basic. Consider again the example of functional illiteracy men-
tioned earlier: that over 20 percent of 17 year olds are ... marginal readers or 
worse. This is usually considered a failure of American education, and perhaps it 
is. But most of these nonreaders come from the bottom of the cognitive ability dis-
tribution. How well should they be able to read after a proper education, given the 
economic, technological, and political constraints on any system of mass education? 
Id. at 436. 
10. See, e.g., Eric A Hanushek, When School Finance "Reform" May Not Be Good 
Policy, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 423, 425 (1991) (suggesting that there exists "significant 
inefficiency in the operation of schools"). 
11. See, e.g., George A Mitchell, The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, WIS. 
POL 'y RES. INST. REP., Nov. 1992, at 1, 4 ("[o)ne proposal [to improve education) is to 
give low and moderate income parents more choice in selecting the schools for their 
children"); see also John E. Chubb, Political Institutions and School Organization, in 
1 CHOICE AND CONTROL IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 227, 234 (William H. Clune & John 
F. Witte eds., 1990) ("Far from being antithetical to school communities, market institu-
tions may provide the only methods of school control that permit communities to 
flourish."). 
12. See Donald R. Moore, Voice and Choice in Chicago, in 2 CHOICE AND CONTROL 
IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 153, 155-56 (William H. Clune & John F. Witte eds., 1990); 
Martin Carnoy, Is School Privatization the Answer?: Data From the Experience of Other 
Countries Suggest Not, EDUC. WK., July 12, 1995, at 52, 52; JOEL HANDLER, DOWN FROM 
BUREAUCRACY: AMBIGUITIES IN PruvATIZATION AND EMPOWERMENT (forthcoming Apr. 
1996) (manuscript at 257, 329-30, on file with the University of Michigan Journal of 
Law Reform). Decentralized school systems ironically may become highly bureaucratized 
as a way to survive in a regulated market. See Henry M. Levin, The Theory of Choice 
Applied to Education, in 1 CHOICE AND CONTROL IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 24 7, 276-80 
(William H. Clune & John F. Witte eds., 1990); Chubb, supra note 11, at 232-34. 
13. By "accelerated education," I mean programs designed to bring disadvantaged 
students up to grade while they are still in grade school. For a discussion of the need 
for such programs, see generally Henry M. Levin, Financing the Education of At-Risk 
Students, 11 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL'y ANALY8IS 47 (1989) [hereinafter Levin, 
Financing Education), which analyzes the educational needs of at-risk students and 
determines the financial requirements for funding accelerated education. See also Henry 
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tion and to recommend remedial strategies which are realistic 
yet responsive to the complexities and challenges of the task. 
Modern adequacy cases occupy an intermediate position be-
tween the old equity theory and the "true adequacy" approach. 14 
The rest of this Article is an effort to point toward the direction 
of true educational adequacy for economically poor children. 
Part I discusses the factual predicate under an adequacy 
theory for a special remedy aimed at high-poverty schools. Such 
schools have the great preponderance of students who fail to 
meet minimum state standards of student achievement and 
other key educational outcomes. Part II expands the factual 
picture and suggests the scope of an adequate remedy by means 
of a brief discussion of the multiple obstacles faced by high-
poverty schools in delivering quality education. Part III sets out 
the basic architecture of a comprehensive remedy, a remedy 
with three parts. Part III.A recommends an "inquiry pro-
cess"-a set of research studies on locally idiosyncratic condi-
tions, such as the need for new physical facilities and further 
development of school-linked social services. Part III.B covers 
the heart of the remedy-additional resources and accountabili-
ty mechanisms-and recommends a compensatory aid grant for 
each poor student built on a statewide foundation of fiscal 
equity, strongly favoring accountability for results rather than 
detailed regulation of school inputs. Part III.C considers what 
governance structures are most compatible with the recom-
mended approach to accountability. Both local control and 
statewide reform are judged insufficient and, while family 
choice might be a useful element, the most congruent form of 
governance seems to be some kind of "bilateral contracting" 
between agencies of school improvement and each school. 
Finally, despite the emphasis on accountability, this Article 
concludes that "success is better than accountability." Success, 
first established in ambitious educational experiments, can 
yield information about how to be successful on a wider scale 
and satisfy strong political objections about increased educa-
tional spending on poor children. 
M. Levin, Accelerated Schools for Disadvantaged Students, EDUC. LEADERSHIP, Mar. 
1987, at 19 [hereinafter Levin, Accelerated Schools] (discussing methods of improving 
the educational plight of disadvantaged students). · 
14. For a definition and analysis of equity theory, adequacy theory, and true 
adequacy, see generally William H. Clune, The Shift From Equity to Adequacy in School 
Finance, 8 EDUC. POL 'y 376 (1994), which describes the evolution oflitigation strategies 
used to reform inadequate school finance structures. 
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I. WHETHER AND FOR WHOM TO ORDER COMPENSATORY AID 
The basis and proof for courts ordering some kind of compen-
satory aid are actually fairly clear. In every state, high-poverty 
schools contain large numbers of students who achieve scores 
below state-defined minimums on any measure of schooling 
outcomes, 15 especially achievement tests and educational attain-
ment.16 Outcomes for such children show massive deficits. For 
example, the passing rates of children in high-poverty schools 
in Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York are far below the 
statewide averages.17 In New York, the incidence of low 
educational indicators in these schools is truly remark-
abl~conomically disadvantaged children and those children 
from racial and ethnic minorities are all concentrated in high-
poverty/high-minority schools in New York City and other large 
cities.18 Therefore, if adequacy refers to minimum outcomes, 
children in high-poverty schools represent the most serious 
breach of the adequacy standard. 
15. See, e.g., WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU, AN EVALUATION OF THE 
CHAPTER 220 PROGRAM 38 (1994) (noting that more than twice as many suburban 
students scored above the national fiftieth percentile on the tenth-grade reading test 
when compared to the number of urban students scoring at the same level, in a study 
of the public schools in Milwaukee and surrounding suburbs). 
16. "Educational attainment" means the highest grade level a student reaches 
before dropping out. 
17. See Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 400 (N.J. 1990) (ruling on school adequacy 
in New Jersey); Berne, supra note 1, at 2-3, 17-20 (analyzing public education in New 
York); Natriello, supra note 1, at figs. 3-7 (studying schoolchildren in Connecticut). 
18. One commentator has noted: 
The statewide distribution of children from poor families is also striking .... Using 
the New York State Department of Education's definition of high poverty-schools 
with over 41% of pupils in poverty--45% of pupils in New York City are in high 
poverty schools, as are 74% of pupils in the other large city school districts, 
compared to 24% statewide. 
High poverty-high minority schools are an urban phenomenon in New York 
State, where there are 495 such schools. A high poverty school has over 41% of its 
pupils in poverty, and in a high minority school over 80% of its pupils are from 
racial-ethnic minority groups. There are 427,417 students in these high poverty-
high minority schools and 392,069 are in the 418 high poverty-high minority 
schools in New York City. 
Berne, supra note 1, at 2-3. The same study shows 55-60% passing rate on the New 
York State Regents Comprehensive Examination in English for pupils in low-poverty 
schools in suburban and rural districts, compared with a 0-7% passing rate in high-
poverty schools, regardless of location. See id. at 20. 
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On the finance side, the schools attended by such economi-
cally disadvantaged children usually spend near or below the 
state average in dollars per pupil. 19 Thus, a natural experiment 
has occurred in which two sets of schools-high-poverty schools 
and other schools throughout the state-receive about the same 
amount of money. One set-the high-poverty schools-achieves 
outcomes below the adequacy standard, while the other set 
generally passes minimum standards. Apparently, equal dollars 
does not produce equal outcomes. 
II. THE MULTIPLE PROBLEMS OF HIGH-POVERTY 
SCHOOLS AND THE CORRESPONDING NEED 
FOR MULTIFACETED REMEDIES 
At least with regard to acceptable minimum levels of achieve-
ment, such as basic literacy, numeracy, and problem solving, 
the idea that there exists an absolute barrier to achievement 
seems wrong. We have many examples of successful remedial 
programs on a small scale.20 Rather, the efficiency objection 
seems closer to the mark. 21 It seems our educational system has 
not been successful at replicating these smaller effective pro-
grams on a larger scale. 
But the concept of inefficiency, with its connotation of an 
uncaring, public school bureaucracy, is so oversimplified as to 
be blatantly misleading. We do not understand nearly enough 
19. See, e.g., id. at 2-3, 7-8 (providing data relating to high-poverty schools and 
per pupil expenditures in New York). 
20. See, e.g., Elizabeth Fennema et al., Learning Mathematics With Understanding: 
Cognitively Guided Instruction, in 1 ADVANCES IN RES. ON TEACHING 195, 203-16 (1989) 
(proposing a new model for curriculum development); Nancy A. Madden et al., Success 
for All: Longitudinal Effects of a Restructuring Program for Inner-City Elementary 
Schools, 30 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 123, 127-45 (1993) [hereinafter Madden, Longitudinal 
Effects) (describing and evaluating the Success for All reading program); Nancy A. 
Madden et al., Success for All, 72 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 593, 594-97 (1991) [hereinafter 
Madden, Success for Alli (describing and evaluating the Success for All reading 
program). 
21. Cf William S. Barnett, Obstacles and Opportunities: Some Simple Economics 
of School Finance Reform, 8 EDUC. POL'¥ 436 (1994) (discussing potential opportunities, 
problems, and issues raised by growth in education expenditures); Eric A. Hanushek, 
A Jaundiced View of •Adequacy" in School Finance Reform, 8 EDUC. POL'¥ 460, 464 
(1994) (concluding that "[t)here is no consistent relationship between the resources 
applied to schools and student performance") (emphasis omitted). 
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about why education is so difficult in high-poverty schools.22 
Since the problems themselves are not specifically understood, 
it is inevitable that there are few standards by which to mea-
sure an effective remedy. To put it in terms of the Article by 
Morgan, Cohen, and Hershkoff in this Symposium,23 we have 
standards for what a typical good school looks like, but such 
standards are only a partial model for what is needed in high-
poverty schools. 24 School standards for the typical school do not 
embrace the full range of educational services needed in high-
poverty schools-services such as accelerated instruction and 
better attendance policies-and otherwise do not address how 
to achieve standards of good practice in a difficult environment, 
one lacking sufficient family involvement in the educational 
process, safe schools, and a stable, qualified teaching staff. 
Surprisingly, there has been little serious effort to sketch the 
educational process and resulting costs of an effective high-
poverty school. A substantial knowledge gap exists, but we 
know enough that courts could guide the design of a basic 
remedy with the capacity for adjustment in light of further 
research and the knowledge generated by evaluation of the 
reform effort itself. There thus exists a need for a new gener-
ation of adequacy cases that assess the problems of high-pov-
erty schools against reasonable standards and attempt to build 
· effective remedies. The following discussion describes some of 
the problems associated with high-poverty schools in order to 
lay the groundwork for the discussion in Part III of how judicial 
remedies couid offer viable solutions to these problems. 
• High mobility of teachers. At least some high-poverty 
schools have extraordinarily high rates of teacher mobility. 
One source reports that the average tenure of a teacher in 
disfavored high-poverty schools in New York City is approx-
imately six weeks.25 As a result, there exists an absence of 
stability in educational planning and the presence of many 
inexperienced, substitute, and uncertified teachers, or 
22. See William S. Barnett, Economics of School Reform: What Can We Learn 
From Three Promising Models 2-4, 36, 37-38 (Mar. 21, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with the Uniuersity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (existing research tells 
us what effective schools do but little about their processes, costs, and generalizability). 
23. Morgan et al., supra note 7. 
24. See id. at 563, 590-91. 
25. Linda Darling-Hammond, Address at Incentives Forum (Dec. 20, 1994). 
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teachers who are instructing topics that are not in their field 
of specialty.26 
• High mobility of students. Students in high-poverty schools 
also have a high rate of.mobility. Furthermore, many stu-
dents may only attend school intermittently during the short 
time that they are enrolled in a school. As a result, there is 
an inconsistent and unpredictable pattern of episodic atten-
dance which defies efforts of schools and teachers to provide 
a rational, continuous program of instruction. 
•Non-accelerated instructional programs. The consequences 
of falling behind grade-level in achievement are· devastating, 
resulting in a greatly increased probability of dropping out of 
high school.27 Yet few high-poverty schools are effectively 
organized to bring children rapidly back to grade-level. In-
deed, many educational practices, such as pull-out instruc-
tion28 and retention in grade, are counter-productive.29 
• Unsafe and disorderly schools. Learning requires effective 
time spent on tasks, which is unavailable in dangerous, dis-
orderly schools.30 Urban schools face severe disruption from 
their external and internal environments and, thus, must 
expend extra effort and resources to stabilize the school envi-
ronment for students and teachers alike. 
• Insufficient and inadequate physical facilities and instruc-
tional materials. Many urban schools are overcrowded and 
lack the instructional facilities necessary to meet state in-
26. See Berne, supra note 1, at 2-3, 17-20. 
27. See Levin, Financing Education, supra note 13, at 47. 
28. A pull-out program removes the student from the regular classroom for supple-
mentary instruction. Pull-outs have been favored by schools as a means of meet-
ing fiscal auditing requirements but have been criticized on educational grounds 
because of lack of coordination with regular instruction. See Kenneth K. Wong, The 
Changing Politics of Federal Educational Policy and Resource Allocation, in RETHINKING 
POLICY FOR AT-RISK STUDENTS 25, 39-41 (Kenneth K. Wong & Margaret C. Wang 
eds., 1994). 
29. See generally FLUNKING GRADES: RESEARCH AND POLICIES ON RETENTION 
(Lorrie A. Shepard & Mary L. Smith eds., 1989) (presenting research on the effects of 
grade retention and broadly concluding that it is not an effective policy). 
30. See Stewart C. Purkey & Marshall S. Smith, Effective Schools: A Review, 83 
ELEMENTARY SCH. J. 427, 445 (1983) (stating that "[c]ommon sense alone suggests that 
students cannot learn in an environment that is noisy, distracting, and unsafe"). 
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structional mandates. For example, classroom space and 
laboratory equipment are often lacking.31 
•Inefficient staffing patterns. Some evidence exists to suggest 
that urban schools are too large to be effective and that they 
are inefficiently staffed with too many people not involved in 
teaching. For example, in some cases, 60% of the staff may be 
engaged in teaching rather than 80%.32 Another problematic 
pattern is the inefficient management of class size.33 
• Bloated and interfering central bureaucracies and school 
boards. Some research and discussion on urban schools finds 
that the school district system can be an obstacle to effective 
instruction.34 Reduced school district budgets (other than for 
key support services like transportation) and school site 
management are plausible responses to this problem. 
• Unqualified and burnt-out teachers-dumping grounds. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some urban schools become, 
in effect, dumping grounds for teachers who have become 
ineffective or problematic in other schools.35 At least three 
mechanisms may be responsible for the "dumping ground" 
·phenomenon: (1) principals of experimental schools are given 
. unusual authority over personnel selection; (2) the combina-
tion of teachers' contractual rights to decline open positions 
31. See William A. Firestone et al., Where Did the $800 Million Go? The First Year 
of New Jersey's Quality Education Act, 16 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL 'y ANALYSIS 359, 
367 (1994) (reporting that inadequate space was "the most striking problem reported 
by the urban low-wealth districts" surveyed). 
32. Valerie E. Lee & Julia B. Smith, Effects of High School Restructuring and Size 
on Gains in Achievement and Engagement for Early Secondary School Students, 68 Soc. 
EDUC. (forthcoming 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (assessing the impact of attending restructured 
secondary schools on students in their early years of high school). 
33. One study found that, although schools in Boston average arithmetically one 
teacher for every 17 students, actual classrooms seldom achieved this number. Karen 
H. Miles, Finding Time for Improving Schools: A Case Study of Boston Public Schools 
1 (Apr. 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Michigan Journal 
of Law Reform). Most classes had about 22 students per teacher because there were 
very small classes in special education and other subjects. Id. at 3-4. These inefficient, 
small classes could be eliminated, such as by consolidating grades, thereby reducing the 
student-teacher ratio for regular academic subjects. 
34. See G. Alfred Hess, Jr., Adequacy Rather Than Equity: A New Solution or a 
Stalking Horse?, 8 EDUC. POL 'V 544, 561-65 (1994) (discussing the interaction of 
schools, school districts, and state and federal governments in setting policy). 
35. E.g., Darling-Hammond, supra note 25. 
664 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 28:3 
in and transfer out of troubled schools and the privilege of 
good schools with a surplus of applicants to reject the appli-
cations of troubled teachers, resulting in a systematic concen-
tration of troubled teachers in troubled schools; and (3) the 
procedural difficulties in dismissing teachers for less than 
blatant misconduct. 
• Lack of parental involvement. Parental support and coach-
ing are well understood to be important components of ac-
ceptable educational achievement and are lacking for many 
poor, urban school children. 36 
• Lack of social and medical services. Because hungry school 
children with toothaches and in need of eyeglasses make less 
effective students,37 adequate social services can make a real 
difference in educational achievement.38 
•Lack of incentives to emphasize student performance. Schools 
and teachers generally lack incentives to use their time and 
resources in ways that maximize student achievement. Rather 
than undertake the difficult and uncertain task of accelerated 
instruction, many schools go through standard teaching 
routines and use their budgets in traditional categories.39 
36. See MARGARET c. w ANG ET AL., NATIONAL CTR. ON EDUC. IN THE INNER CITIES, 
SCHOOL LINKED SERVICES: A RESEARCH SYNTHESIS 23-25 (analyzing parental involve-
ment programs); Madden, Success for All, supra note 20, at 596 (describing the 
importance of parental involvement in the Success for All program); David Sullivan, 
The Robert M. LaFollette Institute of Public Affairs, An Understanding of What Is 
Possible: A Guide to Collaboration and the Coordination of Services in Schools 11 (Aug. 
1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law 
Reform). 
37. For a description of the conditions in some of the nation's poorest schools, see 
generally KOZOL, supra note 4, which describes the state of public education in some 
urban and impoverished school districts in the United States). See also JONATHAN 
KOZOL, DEATH AT AN EARLY AGE (1967) (describing the author's experience as a teacher 
in Boston in the mid-sixties). 
38. See generally Edward F. Zigler & Matia Finn-Stevenson, Schools' Role in the 
Provision of Support Services for Children and Families: A Critical Aspect of Program 
Equity, 8 EDUC. POL 'v 591 (1994) (discussing the importance of support services in 
achieving educational equality); WANG ET AL., supra note 36, at 1-31 (suggesting 
services should be school based); Sullivan, supra note 36, at 1-35 (suggesting 
schooVcommunity partnerships in providing services). 
39. See Richard F. Elmore, Thoughts on Program Equity: Productivity and 
Incentives for Performance in Education, 8 EDUC. POL 'v 453, 455-57 (1994). 
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III. THE BASIC ARCHITECTURE OF A 
COMPREHENSIVE REMEDY 
665 
Keeping in mind the problems facing high-poverty schools, 
there are certain important elements of a comprehensive court-
ordered adequacy remedy for high-poverty schools. Several 
points, however, should be emphasized at the outset. First, 
while courts might well be required to initiate such a remedy 
on behalf of underrepresented poor children, the remedy itself 
would have to be designed legislatively at both state and local 
levels. In that sense, the judicial remedy is really comprehen-
sive, legislative reform with judicial stimulus.40 Second, the 
remedy should include inquiry procedures and research neces-
sary to design parts of the remedy or modify them as time 
progresses. Third, while the recommendations are hopefully 
well-considered, they are also tentative and suggestive, offered 
as much to guide analysis as to suggest final action. In addition 
to the need for ongoing analysis, remedies must conform to local 
needs and to the existing policy environment. 
A. A Set of Independent Studies and 
Structural Design Efforts 
The core issues of an effective remedy are instructional 
resources and accountability, including governance. This Part 
briefly recommends inquiry processes for several issues that 
require specifically tailored fact-finding or institutional devel-
opment and thus resist generic policies. 
•Physical facilities and instructional materials. In states that 
are undergoing court-ordered school finance reform, funds 
intended for instructional improvement have been diverted to 
repair dilapidated facilities or to build new classroom space 
· needed for state-mandated classes.41 The only rational way 
to address this problem is to conduct an audit of capital 
needs, to build adequate facilities, and to provide for a fair 
40. Such was the case in Kentucky. See Trimble & Forsaith, supra note 6, at 605-13. 
41. See, e.g., Firestone et al., supra note 31, at 367 (finding that low-wealth New 
Jersey school districts used funds earmarked for curriculum improvement to rebuild 
school facilities). 
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apportionment of the costs between state and local sources. 
There also should be an audit of instructional materials, 
because anecdotal evidence suggests that many poor, urban 
schools do not provide students with books and other materi-
als to use outside of school.42 
• Study of student mobility and new attendance policies. The 
problem of student mobility requires action at the school, 
district, and state levels. Schools and districts need to adopt 
intelligent and firm attendance policies. Districts may need 
to change attendance rules and provide transportation to 
maximize the likelihood of continuous instruction. Again, both 
the state and the local district should share these expenses. 
The district is in the best location to build a "tracking'' sys-
tem that is capable of identifying intra-district attendance 
patterns and assessing the effectiveness of various policies.43 
• Teacher mobility. To address the problem of teacher mobili-
ty, states should begin experimenting with salary bonuses 
and other policies for increasing the number of qualified 
applicants per position and reducing turnover during the first 
five years of teaching. States may also need to consider re-
form of the personnel system by, for example, delegating 
hiring to the school level, removing unproductive personnel 
restrictions, and helping schools develop more effective per-
sonnel policies.44 
• Continued development of school-linked social services. The, 
development of social services for poor children is a long-
range project with its own logic and timetable. For example, 
funding comes from multiple sources and varies significantly 
by state, district, and school.45 Thus, a rational approach to 
42. See KOZOL, supra note 4, at 24, 28-29, 34, 49, 52-53, 63, 86-87, 131, 138-39, 
157-58. 
43. While districts may be overly bureaucratic and intrusive with respect to the 
core of the educational process, they, or some regional authority, may by necessary to 
deal with problems that are beyond the control of individual schools. 
44. See generally RICHARD J. MURNANE ET AL., WHO WILL TEACH? POLICIES THAT 
MATTER (1991) (summarizing hiring practices, attrition rates, and the characteristics 
of prospective teachers and teachers who leave and later return to teaching, concluding 
with recommendations for licensing requirements and teaching incentives). 
45. Michael W. Kirst, Equity for Children: Linking Education and Children's 
Services, 8 EDUC. POL 'y 583, 587-88 (1994). . 
SPRING 1995) Accelerated Education 667 
this very important policy would ensure that the planning 
proceeds as expeditiously as possible.46 
• Changes in school size. A final area needing special study 
is how best to create schools of a manageable size not larger 
than 500 students. There exist various ways to accomplish 
this goal-through schools within schools, or in conjunction 
with a building program. Timetables and logistics will also 
vary, adding to the importance of a planning process. 
B. Additional Instructional Resources and 
Accountability Mechanisms 
This Part considers the core of the remedy for high-poverty 
schools: additional funds for accelerated instruction and mecha-
nisms for encouraging efficient use of resources, that is, guaran-
tees that the extra resources are, in fact, used for accelerated 
instruction. 
1. Calculating the Amount of Compensatory Aid-The 
accepted method for calculating compensatory aid involves 
establishing the cost of the educational services necessary to 
reach defined educational outcomes.47 The challenges of making 
the calculation in an adequacy context are great, though per-
haps similar to other contexts, such as special and bilingual 
education. First, the minimum standard can be defined in 
different ways-for example, as all children reaching the mini-
mum or as the average child reaching the state average or 
grade level. There are quite frequently a few children, overlap-
ping with students in special education programs, who would 
require an exorbitant amount of resources to reach minimum 
achievement. Second, there are many potential categories of 
spending or types of services which have a plausible connection 
to higher achievement: safety, physical plant (e.g., heated 
classrooms), extra staff (e.g., tutors), extended instruction 
(e.g., preschool, summer school), staff for program management, 
professional development (e.g., training of teachers in 
46. See Madden, Success for All, supra note 20, at 599; Zigler & Finn-Stevenson, 
supra note 38, at 600--04; Sullivan, supra note 36, at 1-4 (suggesting collaboration as 
the means to encourage these plans). 
47. See Richard A Rossmiller, Equity or Adequacy of School Funding, 8 EDUC. 
POL 'y 616, 618 (1994). 
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accelerative teaching methods), higher salaries to hire and 
maintain qualified teachers, school-linked social services,48 and 
bonuses to schools for outstanding performance.49 Finally, 
schools differ in the efficiency with which they transform inputs 
into outcomes, so that different schools may require different 
amounts of money, and most schools could reach higher 
outcomes on existing resources. Finally, most high-poverty 
schools already receive some compensatory aid. Chapter 1 funds 
are distributed by the federal government to states and thence 
to local educational agencies according to the number of poor 
and low-achieving students in the school districts under those 
agencies.50 Available monies are widely distributed because of 
a very low threshold of eligibility.51 The basic grant is about 
$1000 per pupil. A smaller amount of additional funds is 
distributed to localities with a concentration of eligible stu-
dents, but even this threshold is below the national average, 
resulting in wide geographic coverage and low per-pupil 
amounts. Local education authorities have discretion about how 
to allocate funds across schools but presumably would include 
or favor high-poverty schools. Most funds go to elementary 
schools because of the perceived importance of preventing early 
educational deficits.52 In 1987-1988, for example, seventy-one 
percent of the students served by Chapter 1 attended elemen-
tary school.53 But, according to one study of a sample of schools, 
per-pupil expenditures funded by Chapter 1 were lowest in 
high-poverty schools located in low-revenue districts, "precisely 
the schools one would expect to have the greatest need."54 
It was recommended in Part III.A of this Article that studies 
be undertaken to establish the approach to spending in certain 
48. See Clune, supra note 14, at 387-88. 
49. See generally Craig E. Richards et al., Cooperative Performance Incentives in 
Education, in REFoRMING EDUCATION: THE EMERGING SYsTEMic .APPROACH 28 (Stephen L. 
Jacobson & Robert Berne eds., 1993) (discussing the use of cooperative performance 
incentives in education). 
50. Chapter 1 funds are provided by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 2711 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
51. Chapter 1 only requires that there be at least ten children eligible for funding 
in a district. See 20 U.S.C. § 2711(b), (c). 
52. See Wayne C. Riddle, Federal Aid for the Education of Disadvantaged Children: 
Funding, Participation and Legislative Trends, in HELPING AT-RISK STUDENTS: WHAT ARE 
THE EDUCATIONAL AND FINANCIAL COSTS 12, 19-20 (Patricia Anthony & Stephen L. 
Jacobson eds., 1992). 
53. Id. at 18. 
54. JAY CHAMBERS ET AL., AMERICAN INST. FOR RESEARCH, TRANSLATING DOLLARS 
INTo SERVICES: CHAPTER 1 RESOURCES IN THE CONTEXT OF STATE AND LoCAL RESOURCES 
FOR EDUCATION at xv (1993). 
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categories, such as capital needs and teacher salaries. Some 
allowance also must be made for inquiry and proof in each 
lawsuit as to state standards and local needs. Despite these 
challenges, a tentative approach and even a typical dollar 
amount is emerging. First, raising the average achievement in 
high-poverty schools to the state average or to grade level 
seems a reasonable goal that satisfies the criterion of dis-
tributional equity in that no groups would be systematically 
disadvantaged.55 Certainly this result would be a significant 
achievement for practically all high-poverty schools. Second, as 
for the amount which should be spent, given the complexity of 
the variables affecting outcomes, there is no substitute for a 
pragmatic approach that would determine a best estimate of the 
funds needed, to some extent influenced by the constrained 
financial conditions of most states. Well-financed accelerated 
schools spend about $2000 per pupil on accelerated instruction, 
including extra staff, program management, outreach, preschool 
and professional development.56 In theory, the amount of new 
aid required would be reduced by existing compensatory aid, 
including federal, or Chapter 1, and state aid. Finally, any costs 
associated with a new system of accountability and governance 
should not be deducted from compensatory aid to schools in-
tended for instruction but rather should be added to the bud-
gets of state and local government. 
Such recommendations seem acceptable as a place to begin. 
Once a state starts a program of accelerated education for high-
poverty schools, data can be collected on the conditions of 
success. For this reason, it may be advisable to fund groups of 
schools at various levels above and below the best estimate to 
provide a natural experiment. 
2. How to Structure the Rest of the Formula-Compensatory 
aid is only one aspect of funding public education, and its 
effectiveness depends on the structure of the entire system of 
school finance. First, there is the old problem of the variable 
55. Henry M. Levin, The Economics of Justice in Education, in SPHERES OF 
JUSTICE IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS, 1990 YEARBOOK OF THE AMERICAN EDUCATION FINANCE 
AsSOCIATION 129-45 (D. Verstegen & J. Ward eds., 1991). Determining how long to 
maintain compensatory spending if achievement does not rise to the standard estab-
lished is one of the problems considered in the desegregation case of Missouri v. 
Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2045-46 (1995). 
56. Clune, supra note 14, at 388; William H. Clune, Adequate and Efficient-The 
Role of Research, in HOLDING SCHOOLS ACCOUNTABLE: PERFORMANCE-BASED REFORM 
IN EDUCATION (Helen Ladd ed., forthcoming 1996) (manuscript at 4, on file with the 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
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base, addressed in federal law through comparability and 
supplementation requirements of Chapter 1.57 If base spending 
varies widely among districts, compensatory aid will result in 
widely different amounts of total revenue available. Some 
variation can be allowed to recognize variable costs, efficiencies, 
and allowable differences in local educational goals, but the 
basic point remains-that compensatory aid must be added to 
an equal base in order to buy the same extra services for all 
schools. Second, new funds for public education are severely 
constrained in most states.58 The overall formula must be 
designed intelligently so as not to "break the bank," with 
enough left over after meeting other needs to fund the com-
pensatory portion. Third, the politics of school finance makes it 
imperative to build and maintain a strong political coalition 
behind school reform that can continue to seek to satisfy other 
principles of justice and standards of minimum adequacy.59 
This approach to the structure of school finance formulas, 
which is emerging in research and state policy making, meets 
various needs, offers something for a broad coalition of inter-
ests, and stays within reasonable revenue limits.6° First, a mod-
erately high foundation program serves as a base-minimum 
spending at a fixed local tax rate with the difference made up 
in state aid. The minimum spending level is indexed to a high 
spending rural district, perhaps the ninetieth percentile of rural 
57. See 20 U.S.C. § 2728(b), (c) (1988); see also MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATION 
POLICY AND THE LA w 703 (3d ed. 1992) (explaining that Congress enacted fiscal require-
ments to ensure that school districts would spend Chapter 1 funding as intended). 
58. See STEVEN D. GoLD, THE OUTLOOK FOR SCHOOL REVENUE IN THE NEXT FIVE 
YEARS at v, 5, 7 (Consortium for Policy Research in Educ. Research Report Series No. 
34, 1995). 
59. The Grossman Article in this Symposium provides an excellent description of 
· the relationship between politics and litigation in Oklahoma. See Mark S. Grossman, 
Oklahoma School Finance Litigation: Shifting from Equity to Adequacy, 28 U. MICH. 
J.L. REF. 521, 548-51, 553-56 (1995). 
60. See generally William H. Clune, New Answers to Hard Questions Posed by 
Rodriguez: Ending the Separation of School Finance and Educational Policy by Bridging 
the Gap Between Wrong and Remedy, 24 CONN_. L. REV. 721 (1992) (presenting a three-
part plan for improving the effectiveness of public education); Allan Odden et al., The 
Intricacies of Reforming School Finance: Providing Property Tax Relief Through the 
School Finance System (May 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University 
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Note that the Supreme Court of New Jersey lim-
ited its remedy to the urban districts "with special educational needs," and thus did not 
require a new system of aid for the entire state. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 408-09 
(N.J. 1990). The amount of aid ordered by the court for the special needs districts, 
however, approximated what would be available in a statewide system like the one 
recommended here, in effect creating a high foundation plus compensatory aid. See id. 
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spending. 61 This level of spending has the advantage of not 
forcing rural districts to spend more than they wish, thus 
saving money and avoiding political resistance. The "rural 
ninetieth" probably also corresponds to what independent study 
would establish as a minimally adequate, low-cost program for 
the state. If the required local tax rate is set properly, taxpay-
ers in many poor districts will receive substantial local property 
tax relief, because many poor districts already exceed what is 
likely to be the required minimum.62 The benefit comes from 
the state aid awarded for the minimum local rate. Thus, one 
important group-taxpayers in poor districts-is given some 
relief, while spending rises in a few low-wealth, low-taxing dis-
tricts.63 
A second tier of guaranteed tax base (GTB),64 or power equal-
ization, is added primarily to cover the generally higher average 
costs of suburban and urban districts, but the GTB is also 
available to the rural districts.65 A GTB allows these districts 
to estimate their own costs by choosing a tax rate above the 
minimum in the foundation program, with the GTB compensat-
ing for the wealth of districts. But costs of a GTB can be large 
because of the stimulative effect of high matching grants in the 
lower wealth districts. To counter these costs, the program is 
constrained by. setting the guaranteed tax base at a high but 
not unreasonable level, for example, the ninetieth percentile of 
wealth, and by setting a maximum spending level supportable 
by state aid, again set at about the ninetieth percentile of 
statewide spending. This part of the formula gives something 
to poorer urban and suburban districts in the coalition, avoids 
excessive costs, and provides a high base for compensatory aid. 
The assumption is that cities containing high-poverty schools 
will correctly estimate their general costs by setting a reason-
ably high local tax rate. 
61. See Allan R. Odden & William H. Clune, School Finance Formulas: Aging 
Structures in Need of Renovation 5, 18-19 (June 26, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
62. See ALLAN R. ODDEN & LAWRENCE 0. PICUS, SCHOOL FINANCE: A POLICY 
PERSPECTIVE 200 (1992). 
63. See id. 
64. Under power equalization, an equal tax rate always yields the same spending 
throughout the state. The hypothetical tax base that would produce such spending at 
the defined rates iS called the guaranteed tax base or GTB. When the local tax rate 
produces Jess than the guarantee, the difference is made up from state aid. 
65. See ODDEN & Picus, supra note 62, at 182-92. 
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Finally, the adequacy standard does not require limiting 
spending in the wealthiest districts through spending caps or 
recapture of local revenues for other districts. Lower spending 
in wealthy districts does not help the students in other dis-
tricts; rather, it may harm them by removing a standard for 
excellence and intensifying political resistance.66 
3. Combining Dollars, Inputs, Programs, and Incentives: 
Solving the Dilemmas of Loose Coupling-We now reach the 
problem of how to guarantee adequate outcomes from the 
additional spending. The first question is whether the remedy 
should require specific inputs, such as pupil to teacher ratios, 
certified teachers, and research-based educational programs; or 
whether high-poverty schools should have discretion in how to 
spend the categorical aid. This question is particularly impor-
tant because input standards have been used in proof of the 
violation, as in the Alabama case,67 and it is only natural to ask 
whether the remedy should consist of simply filling the gap 
between the standards and the actual practice. 
Our best knowledge on this question suggests that while 
inputs can be used to monitor quality, diagnose potential 
problems, and set a vision of effective education, they should 
not be used as regulatory standards.68 The reason is our uncer-
tainty about the relationship between educational practices and 
outcomes or, in the language of production functions, the inde-
terminate mix of raw inputs that will produce good outcomes 
for specific teachers and students.69 Specified inputs and levels 
of inputs are a best guess about effective average practice but 
may not be the best answer in a particular context. Thus, 
schools should be given considerable flexibility in how they 
spend resources and should be held accountable only for results. 
If the results are not good, then deviations from standard 
66. See Clune, supra note 60, at 739-40 (arguing against recapture of local tax 
revenues and spending caps for wealthy districts). 
67. Morgan et al., supra note 7, at 564-81, 587-92. 
68. See Andrew C. Porter, National Equity and School Autonomy, 8 EDUC. POLY 
489, 490 (1994); Andrew C. Porter, The Uses and Misuses of Opportunity-to-Learn 
Standards, EDUC. RESEARCHER, Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 27 [hereinafter Porter, Standards]; 
see also Lorraine M. McDonnell, Opportunity To Learn As a Research Concept and a 
Policy Instrument, 17 EDUC. EVALUATION & POLY ANALYSIS 305, 317-18 (1995) 
(concluding that "opportunity-to-learn" standards as a policy will remain primarily 
hortatory because of their political history and technical limitations). 
69. See David H. Monk, Policy Challenges Surrounding the Shift Toward Outcome-
Oriented School Finance Equity Standards, 8 EDUC. POLY 471, 473, 481 (1994). 
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practice may be used to explain why and to suggest possible 
avenues for improvement. 
In this framework, the role of input standards in the violation 
stage is to establish a plausible link between low spending and 
low outcomes by demonstrating the absence among poor schools 
of typically effective practice. The ultimate remedy, however, 
should not tie the schools to typical practice and, indeed, should 
encourage more freedom than is allowed under certification 
standards.70 Of course, equitable remedies have traditionally 
been flexible and discretionary,71 and some tension between a 
standard-oriented violation phase and a flexible remedial phase 
is to be expected in public law litigation. 
The one set of inputs which must be imposed from the outside 
is embedded in the basic theory of accountability for outcomes. 
When a state establishes the knowledge and skills for which 
schools are accountable through testing or other indicators, it 
also imposes, implicitly or explicitly, a curriculum of subject 
areas and specific skills within the subject matters. 72 Public 
authorization of the objectives of education is so fundamental 
to the state role that the Kentucky Supreme Court ordered the 
legislature to develop a statewide curriculum and student as-
sessment as part of the constitutional requirement of a true 
"system" of public schools. 73 The danger of becoming too pre-
scriptive about educational outcomes has prompted advocates 
of systemic reform to urge curriculum "frameworks" rather than 
detailed regulation of curriculum.74 Yet the risk of detailed 
70. The Morgan et al. Article in this Symposium describes the detailed focus on 
inputs and input standards which characterized the violation stage of the Alabama 
litigation, but also refers to an ongoing remedial pha5e which considers a wide range 
of flexible remedies. Morgan et al., supra note 7, at 594-98. See also Robert E. Slavin, 
Statewide Finance Reform: Ensuring Educational Adequacy for High-Poverty Schools, 
8 EDUC. POL 'y 425, 430-33 (1994) (listing seven kinds of programs with strong research 
bases for states to consider). 
71. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 1281, 1292-1302 (1976). 
72. Cf Porter, Standards, supra note 68, at 22 (discussing the ways in which 
schools might be held accountable for meeting certain standards). 
73. See Rose v: Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215-16 (Ky. 1989). 
Note that a state or school district could authorize standards by approving those of 
. intermediate agencies such as school improvement networks. See William H. Clune, The 
Best Path to Systemic Educational Policy: Standard/Centralized or Differentiat-
ed/ Decentralized?, 15 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL 'y ANALYSIS 233, 245 (1993). Networks 
also might serve as the agent for accountability in bilateral contracts discussed infra 
Part 111.C. 
74. See, e.g., Marshall S. Smith & Jennifer O'Day, Systemic School Reform, in THE 
POLITICS OF CURRICULUM AND TESTING: THE 1990 YEARBOOK OF THE POLITICS OF 
EDUCATION AsSOCIATION 233, 249 (Susan H. Fuhrman & Betty Malen eds., 1991). 
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control is always present, sometimes in paradoxical ways. 
Portfolio assessment of student performance, for example, may 
be liberating for the student relative to standardized tests, but 
may go far toward regulating educational practice. For example, 
if students are to be assessed through written work they do for 
regular classes, then teachers may conform their practices to 
produce such papers.75 
C. What Kind of Governance? Solving the Problems of 
Knowledge, Productivity, and Political Support 
The next question is what system of governance is best suited 
to measuring outcomes while otherwise leaving maximum 
discretion at the school level? Four broad options76 are available: 
(1) local control or laissez-faire, (2) state reform, (3) bilateral 
contracts with schools, and (4) family choice or educational 
vouchers. This Part discusses the advantages and disadvantages 
of each, concluding that some form of technically assisted 
bilateral contract, such as chartering, is the most realistic option 
for achieving substantial improvements in outcomes among 
high-poverty schools. 
Local control, or laissez-faire, is the historic system of educa-
tional governance in the United States.77 It is also the reason 
why the United States is so unusual in the world context.78 
Educational reforms are gradually eroding this aspect of the 
system.79 The advantage oflocal control, is allowance for maxi-
mum flexibility at the school level for defining and implement-
75. See Porter, Standards, supra note 68, at 23. The Trimble and Forsaith Article 
in this Symposium contains several good discussions of the pressure exerted on practice 
by the Kentucky student assessment. See Trimble & Forsaith, supra note 6, at 616, 
618-22, 626-30. 
76. These options can be combined in various ways. 
77. See David K Cohen, Governance and Instruction: The Promise of Decentral-
ization and Choice, in 1 CHOICE AND CONTROL IN AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE THEORY 
OF CHOICE AND CONTROL IN EDUCATION 337, 337-38 (William H. Clune & John F. Witte 
eds., 1990); cf John F. Witte, Choice and Control: An Analytical Overview, in 1 CHOICE 
AND CONTROL IN AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE THEORY OF CHOICE AND CONTROL IN 
EDUCATION 11, 30-31 (William H. Clune & John F. Witte eds., 1990) (arguing that 
proponents of decentralization are incorrect to characterize American education as a 
uniform, hierarchically and centrally controlled system). 
78. David K Cohen & James P. Spillane, Policy and Practice: The Relations 
Between Governance and Instruction, 18 REV. RESEARCH EDUC. 3, 6-7 (1992). 
79. See id. at 7-8. 
SPRING 1995) Accelerated Education 675 
ing appropriate objectives. Research suggests, for example, the 
importance in accountability systems of measuring a wide range 
of student performance and giving teachers broad flexibility in 
meeting the widely varying learning needs of individual stu-
dents.80 But complete local control has fallen into. disfavor 
because it has not produced high minimum outcomes,81 and it 
seems to lack the external pressure to change that is needed to 
offset bureaucratic inertia. At least three main biases or flaws 
of educational organization have been accepted as requiring 
some system of external accountability-a lack of outcome 
focus, multiple and conflicting goals, and a lack of incentive for 
efficient use of resources. 82 
State reform is the most common emerging alternative to 
local control.83 The great advantage of state reform is the hope 
for some degree of coherence in educational policy, giving 
schools authoritative guidance about what is expected of them 
and providing powerful statewide incentives for performance, 
such as high-stakes student examinations. A vigorous debate is 
emerging in the United States about advantages and disadvan-
tages of central control, as well as dispute over exactly what 
this concept means. 84 
However, central control clearly must be supplemented and 
adapted for success ip. high-poverty schools because of a lack of 
performance standards and structured technical assistance. 
Even avant-garde state reforms such as Kentucky's emphasize 
content standards85 and general standards of performance over 
80. See Linda Darling-Hammond, Creating Standards of Practice and Delivery for 
Learner-Centered Schools, 4 STAN. L. & POL 'y REV. 37, 47-48 (1992-1993). 
81. See generally Hanushek, supra note 10, at 423-56 (discussing various miscon-
ceptions and problems surrounding school finance reform efforts). 
82. For a related discussion, see William H. Clune, The Cost and Management of 
Program Adequacy: An Emerging Issue in Educational Policy and Finance, 8 EDUC. 
POL 'y 365, 368--69 (1994) (summarizing the work of several scholars on the adequacy 
of educational policy and finance). 
83. For example, sophisticated recommendations from the Legislative Research 
Commission served as the architecture for the ambitious system of reforms in Ken-
tucky. See Memorandum from David W. Hornbeck to Chairmen David K Karem and 
Jody Richards and Members of the Curriculum Committee of Kentucky (Feb. 15, 1990) 
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
84. See generally Clune, supra note 73, at 233 (evaluating the problems and 
implications of systemic educational policy and concluding that such a policy is "fatally 
flawed"); Charles L. Thompson et al., The State Policy System Affecting Science and 
Mathematics Education in Michigan (Sept. 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (comparing two approaches to 
systemic reform as they would relate to teaching mathematics in Michigan). 
85. Content standards are those that define the knowledge and skills every student 
is to learn. 
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performance standards86 for particular groups of students. The 
common approach to performance standards in statewide 
reform is "value added," an approach that expects schools to 
show improved scores annually.87 To be sure, yearly gains 
would be welcome in high-poverty schools, and they are the 
focus of recent reforms in federal Chapter 1 aid for disadvan-
taged students and high-poverty schools. 88 But modest gains fail 
to express the idea of high minimum outcomes which is central 
to the theory of adequacy, and value-added reform may be a 
prescription for never escaping embedded patterns of educa-
tional failure. State reform also fails to offer high-poverty 
schools the kind of focused technical assistance and professional 
development that would be congruent with many higher perfor-
mance goals, such as programs for rapid acceleration of out-
comes. 
A system of family choice, or vouchers, has much to recom-
mend and probably should be part of the reform of high-poverty 
schools in some way. One advantage is a fundamental aspect of 
accountability through which parents can show their displea-
sure by simply abandoning bad schools, rather than appealing 
to a cumbersome and indifferent bureaucracy. When schools fail 
to show adequate progress in Kentucky, for example, family 
choice is one of the remedies which is automatically invoked. 89 
Choice systems also may encourage the formation of motivated 
educational communities over time and encourage healthy 
competition in the whole system.90 One cannot, however, begin 
with choice as a universal remedy as it poses several grave 
dangers. Choice schools have no obvious incentive to adopt 
accelerated education.91 Choice systems also pose a problem on 
86. Performance standards establish levels of knowledge and skill to be attained 
by different groups of students at different times. 
87. See Trimble & Forsaith, supra note 6, at 640-41, 645. 
88. See COMMISSION ON CHAPrER 1, MAKING SCHOOLS WORK FOR CHILDREN IN PoVERTY 
29-31 (1992). 
89. Trimble & Forsaith, supra note 6, at 649-50. 
90. See JAMES s. COLEMAN & THOMAS HOFFER, PuBLIC AND PRlvATE HIGH ScHooI.S: 
THE IMPACT OF COMMUNITIES 221-33 (1987) (discussing the "human capital" and 
"social capital" provided to students by supportive and educated families and 
communities). 
91. See William H. Clune, Educational Governance and Student Achievement, in 
2 CHOICE AND CONTROL IN AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE PRACTICE OF CHOICE, DECEN-
TRALIZATION AND ScHOOL RESTRUCTURING 391, 409-10 (William H. Clune & John F. Witte 
eds., 1990); William H. Clune, Educational Policy in a Situation of Uncertainty; Or, 
How to Put Eggs in Different Baskets, in THE POLITICS OF CURRICULUM AND TESTING: THE 
1990 YEARBOOK OF THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION AssocIATION 125, 133 (Susan H. Fuhrman 
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the supply side. An adequate supply of private schools takes a 
long time to develop, especially if parochial schools are ex-
cluded. Furthermore, poorly designed choice systems could 
severely harm poor children, unless courts were as willing to 
strike down inadequate voucher schools as inadequate state-run 
schools.92 In sum, voucher schools should not be starved of 
resources, should be subject to the same standards of minimum 
student achievement, and should not be exempt from perfor-
mance sanctions-both rewards and punishments. 
Thus, at least in the short term, the most promising way to 
institutionalize high expectations, technical assistance, and 
local flexibility for high-poverty schools is to institute some 
variation of bilateral contracting.93 An agency of government 
must reach an agreement with each school about the high 
outcomes which the school would target and the means nec-
essary to reach these outcomes. The government unit can be the 
state, the district, or an independent professional agency, and 
there may be standard agreements. Research on accelerated 
education shows quite clearly that the key component and 
critical first phase of restructuring is obtaining the consent of 
the local staff about the ends and means of accelerated educa-
tion.94 This agreement may then serve as the blueprint for 
monitoring outcomes, technical assistance, and accountability 
through the use of group bonuses and graduated sanctions. 
Many aspects of this kind of bilateral contracting remain to 
be developed and refined. For example, the agency involved 
with accountability should also offer technical assistance.95 Also, 
& Betty Malen eds., 1991). For an analysis of a particular choice system, see JOHN 
F. WI'ITE ET AL., FOURTH-YEAR REPORT MILWAUKEE PARENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM (1994). 
92. See Carnoy, supra note 12, at 52. 
93. See Clune, supra note 14, at 380 (noting the contractual nature of the "true 
adequacy" approach); Linda Darling-Hammond, Standards of Practice for Learner-
Centered Schools, in OUTCOME EQUITY IN EDUCATION 191, 197-98 (Robert Berne & 
Lawrence 0. Picus eds., 1994) (listing ways to make schools more accountable and 
noting that school districts also must pledge themselves to certain standards); Henry 
M. Levin, The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Achieving Educational Equity, 
in OUTCOME EQUITY IN EDUCATION 167, 181 (Robert Berne & Lawrence 0. Picus eds., 
1994) (suggesting that quality education of at-risk students requires a unity of purpose 
among those who respectively plan, implement, and evaluate educational programs). 
94. For example, the "Success for All" schools, developed by Robert Slavin, require 
that 80% of the school's staff agree to participate in the program. RoBERT E. SLAVIN ET 
AL. , SUCC&<!S FOR ALL: A RELEmlEss Al'PRoAcH TO PREvENTION AND EARLY INIBRvENTION IN 
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS 42 (1992). Levin's "accelerated schools" also require the involve-
ment of the school's staff in designing curriculum and strategies. Levin, Accelerated 
Schools, supra note 13, at 21; Barnett, supra note 22, at 5-6, 7. 
95. The Kentucky system does so at the state level. See Trimble & Forsaith, supra 
note 6, at 632-37. 
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while withdrawal of compensatory aid could be used justifiably 
as an ultimate sanction, the agency should have authority for 
some system of graduated sanctions and intensified technical 
assistance if schools in difficulty are to be improved rather than 
simply punished. 96 
Despite its appeal, bilateral contracting has plenty of dis-
advantages. The contracts themselves could become empty 
exercises of paperwork or emphasize process and planning 
rather than substance. Such was the fate of a similar system in 
a previous phase of the New Jersey litigation.97 The governance 
system also could be bureaucratically unwieldy and beyond the 
technical capacity of our political system. The strains placed by 
reforms on state education agencies are a sobering example of 
this danger.98 Nevertheless, the fundamental structural advan-
tages are great. Even a simple system could succeed in giving 
high-poverty schools three things we have never given them 
before: clear expectations about level of performance, technical 
assistance about how to make improvements, and meaningful 
rewards for success. 
Bilateral contracting also is not as strange and novel as it 
sounds. All over the country, school districts are resorting to 
varieties of contracting for improved performance: charter 
schools, regulated vouchers, privatization, and so forth.99 Under 
96. The Kentucky reforms offer a promising first approximation of such graduated 
responses at the state level. See id. at 649-50. 
97. See Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 392 (N.J. 1990) (finding that the system 
designed "to measure and achieve a thorough and efficient" educational system had 
failed to meet its goal); see generally William A. Firestone & Brianna Nagle, Differential 
Regulation: Clever Customization or Unequal Interference (July 1994) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (describing 
the regulatory oversight system for "special needs districts" in New Jersey and how that 
system created "additional paperwork burdens"). 
98. See, e.g., Richard F. Elmore & Susan H. Fuhrman, Governing Curriculum: 
Changing Patterns in Policy, Politics, and Practice, in THE GoVERNANCE OF CURRICU-
LUM: 1994 YEARBOOK OF THE AsSOCIATION FOR SUPERVISION AND CURRICULUM DEVEL-
OPMENT 1, 8 (Richard F. Elmore & Susan H. Fuhrman eds., 1994) (describing the 
knowledge, resource, and political barriers that policymakers and administrators face 
in implementing reform); Susan F. Lusi, Systemic School Reform: The Challenges Faced 
by State Departments of Education, in THE GoVERNANCE OF CURRICULUM: 1994 
YEARBOOK OF THE AsSOCIATION FOR SUPERVISION AND CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT 109, 
127 (Richard F. Elmore & Susan H. Fuhrman eds., 1994) ("Systemic school reform 
requires much deeper reforms than bureaucracies typically allow."). 
99. See generally CHOICE AND CONTROL IN AMERICAN EDUCATION (William H. 
Clune & John F. Witte eds., 1990) (analyzing both the theory and the practice of school 
choice and decentralization); Priscilla Wohlstetter, Education by Charter, in SCHOOL-
BASED MANAGEMENT: ORGANIZING FOR HIGH PERFORMANCE 139 (Susan A. Mohrman 
et al. eds., 1994) (comparing charter-school legislation in several states and in England). 
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considerable pressure from various sources, political authorities 
appear to be discovering the comparative advantages of this 
form of governance. 100 The coming period should be an interest-
ing one in American educational history and a time for learning 
how to model new governance arrangements on successful 
experiments. 
IV. CONCLUSION: SUCCESS IS EVEN BETTER 
THAN ACCOUNTABILITY 
If we are gradually entering a period of educational policy 
characterized by compensatory aid for high-poverty schools and 
new kinds of educational governance, there are at least two 
great risks in the whole experiment: political skepticism and 
"getting to scale." Political skepticism about increased educa-
tional spending is rampant throughout society and even more 
so when the recipients are poor children who are racial or 
ethnic minorities. For instance, the long history of the New 
Jersey litigation is, among other things, a case study in a court 
battling negative political trends in suburbs and rural areas 
that oppose redistribution of wealth to poor cities.101 A related 
problem is that of "getting to scale"-where good ideas about 
teaching practice and school organization seldom move to most 
schools when they are demonstrated to be effective in a few. 102 
Most efforts to improve urban schools, like most efforts to 
implement any social policy, encounter various degrees of 
acceptance and resistance from different communities.103 For 
100. See TED KOLDERIE, PuBLIC SERVICES REDESIGN PROJECT, CTR. FOR POLICY 
STUDIES, THE CHARTER IDEA: PROGRESS IN '94; A BATTLE COMING IN '93 at 2 (n.d.); 
Kathleen Sylvester, Setting Schools Free: The Charter School Movement in Public 
Education, NETWORK NEWS & VIEWS, Oct. 1994, at 95, 95. See generally MARC D. 
MILLOT, PROGRAM FOR RE-INVENTING PuBLIC EDUCATION, INST. FOR PuB. POLICY AND 
MANAGEMENT & RAND, WHAT ARE CHARTER SCHOOLS?: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
CONCEPT AND THE STATUTES (n.d.) (describing the charter school concept). 
101. See Firestone et al., supra note 31, at 360 (discussing the public's resistance 
to school finance reform); Goertz, supra note 8, at 363 (discussing Republican resistance 
to increased funding for urban schools). 
102. Richard F. Elmore, Getting to Scale With Successful Educational Practices 2-3 
(Nov. 22, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Mi~higan 
Journal of Law Reform). 
103. See, e.g., Henry M. Levin, Little Things Mean a Lot, 8 EDUC. POL 'y 396 (1994) 
(both endorsing and criticizing my adequacy model for school finance reform); Hess, 
supra note 34, at 544-67 (raising concerns about my adequacy theory from the point 
of view of a practitioner). 
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example, a small group of "connoisseur" schools may adopt 
reforms enthusiastically and skillfully; a middle group of 
schools may be slower but eventually may show substantial 
improvement; a final group, perhaps thirty percent, may be 
highly resistant to change, perhaps for reasons which remain 
elusive even under close inspection.104 The two problems can 
converge in a social planner's nightmare when a large, poorly 
designed and financed program encounters strong resistance to 
implementation and social impatience with cost and lack of 
results. 
I believe that the cure to these daunting problems is to build 
a program which emphasizes success over accountability. 
Success can be maximized by going slowly to scale rather than 
implementing the whole system all at once. Improvement 
efforts should focus first on the early grades, for example, 
grades one to three, because the youngest children have not yet 
fallen disastrously behind in their progress. Schools should be 
admitted to contracting status gradually to provide examples of 
success before any significant increases in taxes and to provide 
lessons from early successes and failures. 
While the challenges are great, so is the promise. The two 
earlier experiments in vertical equity, special education and 
bilingual education, have serious problems, but are also accept-
ed as at least partial success stories. How can deaf children and 
children who do not speak English make adequate progress 
without special attention to their communicative problems? At 
the most fundamental level, the concept of adequacy in school 
finance is extremely simple: it recognizes the special needs of 
a new group of students, those in high-poverty schools. Adequa-
cy theory sets appropriate, high expectations of performance, 
and it delivers the resources and governance necessary to reach 
those goals. 
104. For a description of the results of one Chicago program, see Hess, supra note 
34, at 557-58 (finding that one-third of the schools studied engaged in significant 
reform, one-third in unfocused changes, and one-third in few changes). See also Levin, 
supra note 103, at 400 (estimating that, in one program, half of the schools "take off 
immediately," one-third take more time, and 15% face serious obstacles). 
